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Kornegay, N. Bromfield, N. Plain View Doctrine. The constitutional and statutory guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not prohibit seizure of evidence and its introduction into evidence on a subsequent prosecution where no search is required. Simmons, N. No search warrant is needed to seize items in plain view. Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Defendant's Vehicle.
Johnson, - N. When police officers discover evidence of a crime in plain view, without the necessity of a search, they may seize the evidence without obtaining a search warrant. Young, 21 N. When contraband material is in plain view no search is necessary, and the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not prevent either the seizure of the contraband without a warrant or its introduction into evidence. Walker, 25 N. Trial court erred in suppressing the rifle, as it was in plain view after the officer learned that defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm.
Price, N. Evidence of crime falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view is subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence. Mitchell, N. When Lawfully on Premises. Carr, 21 N. By being lawfully on the premises officers are entitled to seize such evidentiary objects connected with defendants as are in plain view. Alford, N. While Conducting Lawful Search. Travatello, 24 N. Search of Automobiles and Conveyances. Where police officers are exercising proper precautionary measures, it is not error to complete the search of defendant's automobile at a scene more tranquil than that at which the arrest was made.
Hardy, 17 N. Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress cocaine found in the trunk of a car defendant rented following a stop of the car for speeding because the trial court determined that a vehicle search by police officers was consensual; and the police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity because defendant and the driver of the car gave conflicting stories, the driver avoided direct eye contact with a police officer, and the back seat was full of personal belongings indicating that drugs might be in the trunk.
These factors, coupled with the specific experience and training of the officers at the scene, gave rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion. Bell, N. When defendant's vehicle was properly subjected to an investigatory stop, and he was observed reaching under his front seat and then exited his vehicle and refused to comply with orders to get back in his car, police could conduct a protective search of the vehicle.
Edwards, N. Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his car after it was stopped for a traffic violation, as the search of the vehicle was based on defendant's unlimited consent, and further, information received from a passenger as to where contraband could be found in the vehicle justified the search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, pursuant to U.
IV and N. Baublitz, N. Where the police officer stopped defendant for a traffic violation, the officer had a reasonable suspicion pursuant to N.
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IV to expand the scope of the detention; defendant, who was seated next to the officer in the patrol car while the officer wrote a traffic citation, exhibited extremely nervous behavior, including a heartbeat that was visible through defendant's shirt, and defendant gave inconsistent responses as to where defendant was going. Hernandez, N. Stop of vehicle defendant was riding in violated N.
Murray, N. Defendant's claim that an officer should have informed him that he was searching for narcotics so that defendant could have issued some limiting instructions before consenting to a vehicle search under the Fourth Amendment, U. IV, and N.
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Heien, N. Probable Cause to Stop Defendant's Vehicle. Reynolds, N.
Police officer had probable cause pursuant to U. Officer had probable cause to stop defendant because the officer, who was traveling behind defendant, saw defendant change lanes without signaling, which was a violation G. Traffic stop violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights since the legal justification for a deputy's stop of defendant's vehicle was not objectively reasonable as the deputy stopped defendant for speeding under a mistaken belief as to the legal speed limit, and it was undisputed that defendant was not exceeding the speed limit; the U.
McLamb, N. Officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was involved in illegal activity when they stopped defendant's vehicle as: 1 an informant had told the police that defendant would be transporting cocaine that day and described the vehicle and indicated that the informant had seen cocaine in defendant's possession; 2 a car matching the informant's description arrived at the designated location at the approximate time specified; 3 the informant confirmed that the driver of the vehicle was defendant; and 4 the totality of the circumstances gave the officers a reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs, which gave the officers probable cause to arrest and search defendant's car.
Crowell, N. Defendant's motion to suppress evidence was properly denied, because the officer's observation of a speeding vehicle provided reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop and the conclusion that defendant was the person driving the vehicle was supported by the officer's description of the speeding vehicle and testimony that the officer only lost sight of the vehicle for a short time but immediately recognized the car and the driver when he the vehicle again after turning a corner the officer believed the car had taken.
Royster, N. The Supreme Court further declared subjective motives of police officer immaterial and upheld use of the objective. When rule standard to determine reasonableness of police action, related to probable cause, in view of constitutional concerns. McClendon, N.
Drug Dog Sniff. Brimmer, N. Instinctive action by a police dog, unguided and undirected by the police, in nuzzling the opening of a garbage bag found in a closet of defendant's residence to reveal marijuana inside the bag, which brought evidence not otherwise in plain view into plain view, was not a search within the meaning of constitutional law. Miller, N. Without probable cause more particularized to defendant, the search of defendant, a passenger, violated the Fourth Amendment and N. Smith, N. Sobriety Checkpoint. Burroughs, N.
Attempt to Evade Checkpoint. Griffin, N. Informant's tip was sufficiently reliable to justify an investigative stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, as well as a brief investigative detention of the vehicle's occupants, to search for weapons. Sanchez, N. Informant's tip had sufficient reliability and specificity to constitute reasonable suspicion to stop defendant as: 1 the chief of police had known the informant for 13 years, including as a child, and knew that the informant had provided previous information about illegal drug activity that had yielded an arrest; 2 the tip did not have to be analyzed as an anonymous tip; 3 the basis for the informant's knowledge did not have to be proven under the totality of circumstances test; and 4 the informant's tip provided specific information about defendant's future actions, including correctly predicting defendant's mode of transportation, defendant's destination, and defendant's time of arrival, which, after it was corroborated by the police, sufficiently demonstrated that the informant had inside knowledge about the suspect, giving the police reasonable suspicion to believe the rest of the informant's tip.
Car Found in Plain View. Improper Vehicle Stop. Kochuk, N.
Length of Investigative Stop. Thorpe, N. Suspicion of Impairment Held Reasonable. Jones, 96 N. Defendant's contention that the trial court should not have denied defendant's motion to suppress because the officer who stopped defendant's two-wheeled motorized vehicle did not have probable cause to make the stop had to be rejected; the officer was only required to have reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle because the officer did not stop defendant's vehicle based on the traffic violation of operating an unregistered vehicle, which would have required probable cause, but, instead, stopped the vehicle after observing defendant operate the vehicle in a manner that allowed the officer to reach the reasonable conclusion that defendant was driving the vehicle while defendant was impaired.
Jones, N. Investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle at around a. Barnard, N. Blood Test on Unconscious Defendant. Constitution and this section, because of 1 the existence of probable cause to arrest; 2 the limited nature of the intrusion upon the person; and 3 the destructibility of the evidence. Hollingsworth, 77 N. Trial court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress blood draw evidence a police officer collected from a nurse who was treating defendant because the officer did not advise defendant of his rights and did not obtain his written or oral consent to the blood test; the State's post hoc actions did not overcome the presumption that the warrantless search was unreasonable, and it offended the Fourth Amendment and the State Constitution.
Romano, - N. Trial court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress blood draw evidence a police officer collected from a nurse because the record did not affirmatively show that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe defendant, who was unconscious during the blood draw, committed the implied consent offense of driving while intoxicated; the record did not affirmatively show that defendant was intoxicated while he drove, but it raised a question as to whether defendant became very intoxicated.
Based on the United States Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment precedent regarding consent, the blood draw from defendant could not be justified under subsection b as a per se categorical exception to the warrant requirement; the implied-consent statute, as well as a person's decision to drive on public roads, are factors to consider when analyzing whether a suspect has consented to a blood draw, but the statute alone does not create a per se exception to the warrant requirement.
Trial court correctly suppressed defendant's blood sample because subsection b was unconstitutional as applied to defendant since it permitted a warrantless search that violated the Fourth Amendment; blood draws could only be performed after obtaining a warrant, valid consent from the defendant, or under exigent circumstances with probable cause, but the officer who took possession of defendant's blood did not get a warrant, and there were no exigent circumstances.
Drug and Alcohol Testing. Jones v. Graham County Bd. In a case in which defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to habitual impaired driving and appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a blood test, the warrantless blood draw did not violate Article I of the North Carolina Constitution. Fletcher, N.
It was not error to deny defendant's motion to suppress the results of a nonconsensual, warrantless, blood draw because, when defendant refused an intoxilyzer test, exigent circumstances allowed the draw, considering the totality of the circumstances, under G. Dahlquist, N. Hair and Saliva Samples. Pearson, N. Reasonable suspicion for weapons search. Moreover, the officer was led to a reasonable suspicion because of defendant's 1 erratic answers, 2 evasive actions, 3 continued refusal to show the officer the contents of his right fist, and 4 choice to raise his fist in a manner which led the officer to believe that defendant was about to strike him.
Limitations on Pat-Down Search.